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Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Lessons Learned 
Lewis “Lee” Sachs 
By Yasemin Esmen 
Lewis “Lee” Sachs was counselor to Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner and head of the 
Obama administration’s Financial Crisis Response Team in the US Department of the 
Treasury. Mr. Sachs led the development and coordination of the Obama administration’s 
Financial Stability Plan to stabilize the financial system during the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007–09 (GFC). He was tasked with continued coordination with the outgoing Bush 
administration, as well as putting together a team to develop further restructuring plans and 
oversee their execution. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Sachs. 
There are three major steps to a financial stability plan: developing an architecture 
for the plan, establishing coordination, and putting a team together. 
The crisis coincided with the presidential transition period. The first step of the new 
administration’s crisis response, according to Sachs, was to develop an architecture for the 
Financial Stability Plan. Afterward, they started coordinating with the Federal Reserve, 
other regulators, and the outgoing administration. Third, they put a team together to 
develop and execute their plans, which according to Sachs proved challenging. Specific 
expertise was needed yet: 
Treasury is not set up like the Defense Department where you have standing armies 
who are prepared to fight wars and defend the country when necessary. The 
Treasury Department is not set up to do that. We did not have standing armies of 
people with expertise in fighting financial crises. 
The aim of any stability plan should be to rebuild confidence in the markets and the 
financial system as a whole. When there is a change of administration, coordination 
is very important to ensure that confidence. 
Sachs said of the situation facing his team that the real urgency was the country’s economy 
and how it was affecting people’s lives. He explained, 
So, everything we did, every plan we put together, every step we took, was designed 
to break that negative feedback loop, with all those things negatively impacting the 
others. We had to develop detailed plans and start to rebuild confidence in the 
markets, the financial system, et cetera, very quickly. 
Sachs stressed that it was vital that the Obama administration coordinate with the outgoing 
administration, and this was established very well. Continuity in policies was also very 
important, as well as coordinating with other agencies such as the Federal Reserve, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Sachs 
said, 
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You never want to have a financial crisis; you certainly do not want to have one 
during transition between administrations. However, if you are going to have to 
have one, and you are going to have to have one during a transition, it is much better 
to have it when the outgoing administration is as skilled, open, easy to work with [as 
the Paulson Treasury in the Bush administration], and I think they deserve a lot of 
credit for that. 
That was largely a pretty smooth process. Each organization, of course, had their 
own issues that they had to think about, but also, more importantly, recognized that 
the only way we were going to be able to break the fever of the crisis was for each of 
the organizations to work together. 
Confidence is the cheapest form of stimulus. 
Without confidence in the financial system, stressed Sachs, credit cannot flow, markets 
cannot function, and businesses become weak. “So, everything we were doing was designed 
to rebuild confidence in the system, institutions, markets, and the economy as a whole. 
Nothing succeeds without confidence.” 
This confidence was attained through a combination of programs. These programs were 
designed to work together with others to rebuild that confidence. One such example Sachs 
offered involved the efforts to prevent opacity at financial institutions. He noted, 
What we did was put together several programs, the most prominent of which were 
the stress tests that were designed to show the world what was in these banks and 
what they would look like in the most severe economic scenarios. 
This was coupled with a capital backstop. If a bank needed to raise capital but could not at 
the end of six months, the government would step in and buy what was necessary. This 
way, the government was ensuring that the banks would not fail and that there would not 
be runs from the banks. Sachs explained further: 
We felt quite strongly that the system as a whole is better off when banks are held in 
private hands as opposed to government hands. However, we set a backstop 
because we did not know how much capital would be necessary, and we did not 
know if the markets would be prepared to provide that capital. 
Acting swiftly has many benefits. However, this may be difficult to do, and many of 
the steps that need to be taken may be very unpopular.  
Sachs shared that it is best to act soon and with great force to fight a crisis. However, he 
noted, it is also difficult to do so. “No one likes to see the government taking steps to ‘bail 
out a bank.’” He notes that the administration did not think they were bailing out banks, but 
he admits that is how it was perceived. 
According to Sachs, many of the steps that have to be taken early to be effective are 
unpopular but necessary to “put out the fire.” Waiting to take those difficult steps only 
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exacerbates the crisis as it gets deeper and becomes more expensive to overcome as more 
people lose their jobs and homes, and more businesses lay off workers or close their doors. 
The problem is, because the steps you have to take are so unpopular, it is harder to 
take them until the pain has gotten so bad that the world says, “You have to do 
something to stop this. It is just too painful.” The longer these crises go on, the 
louder that gets, and then, frankly, the easier it is to do the things that are necessary. 
Although they have been, to this day, criticized for “saving the Wall Street,” saving the 
institutions that make up the financial system was the only way to save the system as a 
whole, insisted Sachs: 
Everything we did was viewed through the lens of how to stop losing 800,000 jobs a 
month, how to stop the economy from declining at an 8, or 9, or 10 percent annual 
rate. This was the most effective, cheapest way to do it. To this day I have not seen 
any ideas or proposals, even with the benefit of time and 20/20 hindsight, that 
would have allowed us to achieve those goals, without reestablishing confidence in 
the system and the institutions that make it up at the time. If we could have, we 
would have. 
Measures taken to save the patient should also help ensure its well-being going 
forward. 
All the steps around the Financial Stability Plan were designed to first save the economy 
and the financial system from collapsing. However, by ensuring that these institutions were 
well capitalized, these measures also made sure that they were in a good position to lend 
going forward.  
In fact, if you look at what did happen subsequently and compare it to the 
experience in other countries, which were not necessarily as aggressive [as the US], 
our institutions and the flow of credit, and our recovery, happened much more 
quickly than elsewhere. 
Opacity, shortages in capital and liquidity, and anything that can lead to panic can 
cause weaknesses in the system.  
By creating uncertainty, opacity reduces confidence, which creates weaker markets, less 
credit, and less business activity. In short, opacity in financial systems or institutions 
decreases confidence in these same institutions and the system as a whole, stressed Sachs. 
He continued that, other than opacity, there are numerous other things we should be 
watching out for when it comes to looking for weaknesses in the system or possible 
triggers for panic. A lack or shortage of capital and liquidity in large financial institutions is 
one of these, he noted; so are threats from the cyber realm and “anything that can lead to 
volatility in the markets and in the economy.”  
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